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We provide a theoretical framework showing how CSR activities can insure a firm against lost reputation 
in the face of adverse events. We offer evidence for this linkage through a case study and a multi-year 
analysis of stock price responses for S&P 500 companies following product recalls. We find that firms 
with better CSR ratings fare better than those that do not. Furthermore, a firm that is exceptional in 
both doing good and avoiding harm suffers virtually no reputational damage following events. Using the 
results of the study, we offer a guide to managers for determining the appropriate amount and mix of 
CSR to undertake. 
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility, reputation, insurance  
1. Introduction 
For many firms, the most precious asset, the key to sustainable competitive advantage, lies not on their 
balance sheet nor in the human capital of their workforce, rather it is their reputation. For instance, 
IBM’s reputation for being an enterprise friendly and efficient solutions provider has enabled it to beat 
rivals for business over many years. McDonald’s reputation for being a family friendly and economical 
place to eat has sustained its market share in the face of fierce competition from other chains.  
 But reputation can be a fragile thing. Toyota, who became the largest automobile manufacturer 
through its reputation for reliability and value, has suffered grievously as allegations of faulty 
accelerators and cover-ups of these problems have come to light. This can be seen vividly in the resale 
market where even Toyota vehicles unaffected by the recalls declined in value, predicted ultimately to 
be some 4-5%.1  Likewise Dell, who became the leading PC manufacturer largely on the basis of quality 
and low price, has suffered reverses in recent years owing to incidents of laptop batteries catching fire 
and other quality control problems, contributing to the firm’s cumulative loss of a third of its market 
value.2
 The correct response to business risk is to turn to insurance markets or to self-insure. For 
instance, Google, whose reputation rests on the reliability and speed of its search results, takes the 
unusual step of designing its own servers with special features such as a patented internal backup power 
system to maximize reliability and efficiency should a problem arise.
  In short, reputational risk is one of the key business risks that firms face.  
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 In this paper, we will argue that a firm’s corporate social responsibility (hereafter CSR) activities 
have the effect of providing partial self-insurance against reputation risk.  To support this claim, we first 
  Manufacturers who are 
dependent on key raw materials will routinely use futures markets to hedge price risk. Multinationals 
will likewise turn to currency markets to hedge exchange rate risk. But there is no obvious market for 
firms seeking to insure against reputation risk.  
briefly sketch a theory showing the link between CSR and a firm’s reputation. Next, we illustrate this 
channel using a case study showing stock price reactions to adverse events experienced by Boston 
Scientific and Guidant in the medical stent market. While the case study is helpful, it is by no means 
definitive. To examine the mechanism more broadly, we conduct a study of the link between reputation 
and CSR for all S&P 500 companies over the period 1991-2006. Our main finding here is that stock price 
response (which we use as a proxy for a firm’s reputation), declines significantly less following an 
adverse event (a product recall), when a firm is engaging in CSR than when it is not.  
 Our study also reveals a key additional insight: While CSR is often thought of as visible “doing 
good” activities, such as charitable contributions, a less visible side, “not doing harm,” proves equally 
important. In particular, we find a synergistic effect on reputation for firms who are exceptional both in 
doing good and avoiding harm. Perhaps more surprising is that a disharmonious strategy, doing good 
while also doing harm, leads to reputational consequences that are worse than simply doing nothing at 
all. For managers, these findings have two key implications: First, even though not doing harm is less 
visible, it should not be neglected as a CSR lever. Second, and perhaps more important, “bad” behavior 
in one aspect of a firm’s operations cannot be erased by “good” behavior in another. CSR as reputation 
insurance only works when a firm is consistent in its application.   
2.  How CSR Acts as Reputation Insurance 
 Firms face a variety of business risks in today’s dynamic environment. A key consideration for 
firms is how best to manage or hedge these risks. Here we describe how CSR activities can play an 
important role in the risk-management dimension of a firm’s strategy.  Consider the situation of Mattel 
in 2007.4 Mattel ‘s CEO, Robert A. Eckert, had just learned that it faced the largest toy recall in history, 
covering some of its most popular product lines.  These toys were found to contain extremely high levels 
of lead paint.  Disclosing the problem and recalling the affected toys would surely be costly to Mattel; 
however the long-run impact on the profitability of the firm would ultimately depend on the cause that 
the public and investors ascribed to the problem. If they saw the problem as one mainly stemming from 
Mattel’s negligence in overseeing its Chinese suppliers, there would be serious, long-term 
consequences. If, however, it were seen as merely an “honest mistake”—something that could happen 
to even a diligent firm—the damage would be much less.  We shall argue that Mattel’s “reputation,” 
driven in part by its perception as a “responsible” corporate citizen, will do much to drive beliefs about 
the proximate cause of an adverse event.  
 Although adverse events have direct costs in the form of regulation penalties and lawsuits, there 
are also indirect costs to consider.  For example, Mattel may have to monitor its input suppliers more 
carefully and engage in a substantial public relation campaigns to communicate such improvements.  
Being a publicly held company, these expected costs will be (almost) immediately reflected in its stock 
price.  Investors will also price in the future expected cost of such adverse event for the firm---their 
beliefs about the possibility of such events happening again.  Obviously, investors’ judgment about this 
risk will be colored by the firm’s reputation before the event.  Is this an anomaly or is it consistent with a 
view that Mattel has been rather cavalier in monitoring its suppliers?  In short, the degree of price 
change following the event will be based on the weight investors place on its cause.  
Similarly, regulators have limited resources to investigate adverse events. In local law 
enforcement, the decision to prosecute some crimes and not others is known as “prosecutorial 
discretion.” In a regulatory setting, a similar principle applies: All things equal, those firms that are 
thought less likely to have committed negligence as opposed to have experienced bad luck will be 
pursued less fiercely or not at all.  
One can think of a scale describing the possible causes of an incident. The left side of the scale is 
labeled “bad luck”—the incident was caused by factors largely out of the firm’s control. The right side of 
the scale is labeled “bad management”—the incident was caused by negligence, foolhardy cost-cutting, 
or some other factor under the control of the firm. Where investors and regulators place an event on 
this scale depends on the firm’s reputation, based on its past actions as a “responsible corporate 
citizen,” leading up to the event.  
[image 1 here] 
Viewed in this light, expenditures on corporate social responsibility (CSR) can be thought of as 
an insurance premium. In normal times, this simply reflects a pure cost; however, when an incident 
arises, the firm is insured to the extent that its past CSR activities tip the scale toward bad luck rather 
than bad management, saving the firm money, avoiding regulatory scrutiny, and preserving the value of 
its brand. That is, CSR provides a contingent benefit.   
The returns from CSR have been much studied by academics.5
The following analogy shows how one may easily reconcile our results with those of existing 
studies.  Imagine one were interested in studying the returns to purchasing earthquake insurance. A 
dataset consisting of premiums versus claims in San Francisco over the last 10 years would conclude 
(correctly) that it is a terrible investment—insurance is a pure cost in “normal” times. The scope of this 
hypothetical study is too narrow to capture the benefits of earthquake insurance. Such is the case with 
many CSR studies as well. By focusing on “events” rather than on normal times, we observe a very 
different story about the value of CSR.  
  The typical conclusion of these 
studies is that returns from CSR are low or even negative. However, these studies focus on returns to 
CSR during “normal” times—i.e. most of the time. When viewed through an insurance lens, however, 
our study offers the opposite conclusion—CSR (done correctly) produces considerable returns.   
3. Two CSR Levers: Doing Good and Avoiding Harm 
In building a reputation as a responsible corporate citizen, a firm has two levers at its disposal. First is 
the positive lever of CSR.  That is, the firm can be involved in activities that contribute to the sense the 
firm “does the right thing.”  Examples of this are everything from investing in local community services 
to treating employees extraordinarily well.  Second is the lever of avoiding negative CSR. Examples of 
negative CSR include employing (or buying from supplier who employs) slave labor, engaging in farming 
or mining in an environmentally unfriendly way, or driving impossibly hard bargains with suppliers or 
workers that leave it impossible for them to earn a living wage.  
3.1 Which lever to pull? 
The bulk of advice and publicity in CSR activities centers on doing good, but avoiding harm also plays a 
key role in determining where the balance of responsibility lies following an incident. Partially this stems 
from the fact that “doing good” activities are more visible and easily measured. For instance, a firm’s 
charitable contributions are readily quantified. In contrast, the costs from avoiding harm activities are 
actually opportunity costs and, as a result, far more difficult to quantify. For instance, the cost to a firm 
of not buying from the cheapest supplier because of that supplier’s labor practices is the cost difference 
between using that supplier and the second-best alternative. This cost never appears on a firm’s income 
statement, nor does the CEO appear in the local paper for its supplier decisions.  
While the costs of avoiding harm are more difficult to measure and convey to various 
stakeholders, the benefits may be greater than an equivalent amount of doing good activities. Doing 
good communicates indirectly to shareholders that adverse events stem from bad luck rather than bad 
management. But the connection is far from perfect—bad managers can easily pool with good ones by 
merely imitating and publicizing doing good activities. In contrast, avoiding harm activities are harder for 
bad managers to imitate. In the example above, a manager would have to investigate the labor practices 
of suppliers, find alternatives, and continue to be vigilant thereafter.  Thus, the connection between 
avoiding harm and avoiding the “bad management” label following an event is more direct.  
Additionally, it can take years to build “good” reputation but only days or months of “bad” 
activities to wipe it away.  In other words, reputation building seems to be negatively sloping.  “Bad” 
activities are going downhill in their effect of reputation erosion, whereas “good” activities are going 
uphill to build reputation.  Thus, a firm seeking only a neutral reputation (i.e., by trying to limit negative 
events and activities) may in the end fare better than the firm that instead commits the same resources 
to “doing good” while neglecting the “avoiding harm” lever.  In fact, as firms are increasingly involved in 
some “good” activities in building positive CSR, the value of doing so diminishes.   
In this spirit, we now consider a case study of two firms that generally match one another on the 
“doing good” dimension but differ in terms of “avoiding harm.” As we shall see, the market comes to 
dramatically different judgments about bad luck versus bad management for the two different firms.  
4. Case Study: Guidant vs. Boston Scientific 
Our case study is not meant to be statistical proof our claims, but rather a helpful illustration of our 
thesis that CSR acts as reputation insurance. The statistical proof is provided in Section 5, where we 
study the link between CSR and firm value following an incident based on all S&P 500 firms over some 
16 years. 
Guidant and Boston Scientific are (were) publicly traded medical device manufacturers involved 
in the production of medical stents. Over the past 12 years, both manufacturers have been troubled by 
numerous stent recalls that ultimately led to regulatory scrutiny. In this case, we study the connections 
between each firm’s CSR activities and the stock price response to news about each stent recall.   
To conduct such a study, we need a measure of CSR activities. Here, we rely on data provided by 
KLD, which is considered the “gold standard” in reputation research on CSR.6
KLD rates each dimension on a 0-4 scale, where each integer represents an additional issue 
being present.  Figures 1 and 2 are a time series of each the positive CSR and negative CSR trends for 
each of our firms on the dimension of product CSR.
  KLD rates firms on several 
areas of CSR, and both on positive and negative dimension.  One such area of rating is product CSR.  
Product CSR can be thought of as the extent a firm conscientiously manufactures and distributes its 
products.  The positive dimension of such CSR includes providing products to needy individuals, extra 
quality control of its supply lines, and its product safety.  The negative dimension includes events such as 
being involved in fights with regulators over product safety and unethical marketing campaigns.  
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Figure 1 reveals that Boston Scientific (hereafter BSX) had a modest rating of positive CSR (i.e., 
1.0) that did not change for the entire series.  Meanwhile, Guidant (hereafter GDT) began with no 
positive CSR rating, matched BSX’s rating after one year, and then maintained this same rating until 
2005, when its rating again fell to zero. There is little to distinguish the two firms in terms of positive 
CSR. Figure 2, on the other hand, reveals key differences in the two firms’ reputations in terms of 
“avoiding harm.” While both companies suffered erosion of their negative CSR ratings over the course of 
the study, save for 1997, BSX always had a worse rating than GDT on this dimension.   
In 1998 BSX recalled one of their stent products. Rather than punishing the firm, the market 
reacted positively—BSX enjoyed a 5.54% positive abnormal return in its stock price in the period 
immediately following the announcement.8   Apparently the market saw the recall as a positive given 
BSX’s past reputation. BSX was seen as being vigilant about its products and acting quickly when issues 
were identified.  
When BSX faced a second recall in 1999, the balance of blame seems to have shifted from bad 
luck to bad management. At this time, BSX’s negative CSR rating was firmly in negative territory at -1. 
This time, the market’s reaction was very different—BSX lost 5.66% of firm value during the event 
period.  The key point to note here is that, despite enjoying an excellent positive CSR rating, the market 
still punished BSX.  
In 2001, GDT issued a product recall for one of its stents. While its CSR situation was similar to 
BSX at the time of its first recall, the market’s reaction was not. Unlike BSX in 1998, the cumulative 
effect of recalls led the market to punish GDT, driving share value down by 6.5% immediately after the 
announcement.  
Meanwhile, both companies continued to neglect the avoiding harm lever, though more so in 
BSX’s case. By 2002, BSX’s negative reputation had fallen to -2 while GDT had fallen to -1. This same 
year, regulators stepped into the stent market and placed BSX under criminal investigation for its past 
recalls. GDT, however, was not included in this probe.  This same pattern repeats itself in the financial 
markets. A GDT recall in 2003 resulted in a 3.1% gain in value while a 2004 BSX recall produced a 
whopping 18.9% loss.  
The difference in price response to the two levers is illustrated further in 2006. At this point, 
GDT lags BSX in terms of positive CSR but is ahead in terms of avoiding harm. Both firms make additional 
product recalls. For BSX, this results in a 12.06% loss in value while GDT suffers only a 4.9% drop in 
value.  
Shortly thereafter BSX purchases GDT.  Does this mean that BSX has “bought” GDT’s relatively 
better reputation in the stent market? This remains to be seen. However, what can be seen in this case 
is the connection between CSR and stock price responses following product recalls.  The case also 
illustrates how this response differs depending on the firm’s “stance” in terms of positive and negative 
CSR. Likewise, it is suggestive of the fact that regulatory scrutiny might also depend on CSR. Of course, 
the case is only suggestive. There are a variety of other aspects of the stent market and the strategies of 
the two companies besides CSR that are neglected in the case. Consequently, the next section examines 
stock price responses to product recalls for all S&P 500 firms for the period 1991 to 2006.  The key 
finding to emerge from this study is to highlight that the features of the Guidant v. Boston Scientific case 
are, in fact, broadly representative. 
5. A Study of CSR, Product Recalls, and Stock Price Response 
To examine the broader case for CSR as reputation insurance, we collected CSR and product 
recall event data on S&P 500 firms from 1991 to 2006.  As with the case study, we used KLD data as a 
measure of a firm’s CSR activities. We obtained event data through the labor-intensive process of hand 
collecting product recalls from indices contained in the Wall Street Journal.  Though imperfect, the WSJ 
index has the advantage of providing an objective benchmark for which events to consider. Moreover, 
omissions will tend to be smaller events, which are likely to be of less importance to firm valuations.  
These data were then merged with the CRSP database of daily closing stock prices for all S&P 500 firms; 
thus allowing us to connect CSR ratings and stock price responses.  
 Figure 3 shows the annual incidence of product recalls in our sample.  As the figure reveals, 
there were about 15 events per year.  This means that each firm in the study had about a 3% chance of 
an event each year.  Events are “rare” events in the life of a firm, not the normal course of business.  
[figure 3 here] 
Figure 4 presents the distribution of stock price returns immediately following events. To 
compute these returns, as with our case study, we calculate abnormal change in firm value following a 
recall. This is the change in firm value that cannot be explained as a result of the particular firm’s size, 
capital structure, and relative performance to others.  In other words, it is the excess return or loss 
attributed to the event.   
[figure 4 here] 
Figure 4 also plots a normal distribution, which is often used as a benchmark for determining if a 
realized distribution is skewed in a particular manner.   The x axis reports cumulative abnormal (event) 
return.  We say cumulative because it is the sum of the return on the day before and the day of the 
event announcement. We include the day before to account for the possibility of news “leakage” prior 
to the public announcement.  The y axis is the density of a given return level, which is essentially just the 
frequency of the given return. Notice that the peak of the realized distribution occurs near zero. The 
market deemed these events as not materially affecting a firm’s value. This is not terribly surprising 
given the breadth of events included in our dataset. For example, one such event is Black & Decker’s 
announcement of a toaster recall. Obviously, one would not expect this to materially affect the fortunes 
of Black & Decker.   
A second key, but expected, feature of the data is the skewed “negative” tail of event returns.  
We would expect that product recalls would more often result in reductions in firm value rather than 
gains. It is reassuring that this feature is apparent in figure 4.  
 While KLD grades all firms on a 5 point scale in both the doing good and avoiding harm 
dimensions of CSR, it is more informative to summarize a firm’s CSR rating along each dimension by a 
binary variable, i.e. a firm can be do good or not and can avoid harm or not. This yields a matrix of four 
possible types of ratings a firm might have as shown in Figure 5.  The size of the circles contained in each 
of the cells of the matrix corresponds to the fraction of firms of each type in our sample.  
 [figure 5 here] 
The largest number of firms falls into the category of being unexceptional in doing good while 
strenuously avoiding harm. The next largest category consists of firms that apparently care little about 
CSR ratings. They are undistinguished on the doing good dimension while being flagged on the harm 
dimension.  A small number of firms are those that are exceptional corporate citizens. They are 
distinguished on the good dimension while avoiding pitfalls on the harm dimension.   Finally, an even 
smaller number of firms are flagged for doing harm but are apparently trying to compensate for this by 
also doing good.  
 While figure 5 describes the CSR of the cross-section of firms, it does not present a picture of 
changing CSR levels over the period of the study. Figures 6 and 7 highlight CSR trends. Despite the 
considerable attention given the CSR over the period of the study, we see no material increase in the 
fraction of firms doing good. Even more surprisingly, the number of firms being rated as doing harm has 
risen dramatically over this same period.  
[figure 6 here] 
[figure 7 here] 
 The trends shown in figures 6 and 7 suggest a change in the mix of firms’ CSR strategies, as 
figure 8 illustrates.  Figure 8 reveals that over study period, firms were increasingly abandoning the 
strategy of avoiding harm. Thus, we see a sharp increase in the number of firms that are undistinguished 
in the doing good dimension while also flagged in the doing harm dimension. Similarly, we see an 
increased trend in firms being involved in both good and harmful activities.  This small but important 
group grows from about 2% to 6% by the end of the series.   As will be seen below, this is a very costly 
strategy.   
[figure 8 here] 
 With this background in mind, we now come to the heart of the study—what is the value to 
firms of various CSR strategies in terms of reputational insurance. Table 1 presents abnormal stock 
returns following events for firms pursuing each of the four CSR strategies we outlined above.   
[table 1 here] 
As a baseline, consider a firm that does not avoid harm nor do good. Such a firm suffers almost a 
1% drop in value following an adverse event. For an S&P 500 company with an average market 
capitalization of $20 billion, this amounts to $200 million in lost value. A firm that avoids doing harm 
while not distinguishing itself on the good dimension halves this loss. Such firms suffer only a 0.5% drop 
in value following an adverse event. Firms that distinguish themselves in both dimensions actually gain 
about 1.1% in value following an event. That is, pursuing CSR on both dimensions seems to produce 
synergistic returns compared to pursuing CSR on only one dimension. Finally, firms that seek to 
compensate for harm by doing good are punished most severely, losing an average of 2.5% of value 
following an event. In terms of our model, doing good alone does not convey a credible signal about a 
firm’s likely negligence associated with an event. If anything, it conveys the opposite signal—good 
actions are seen as a fig leaf for bad behavior.   
While much of the CSR literature focuses on doing good; this may be short-sighted if it leads 
firms to ignore or underplay the avoiding harm dimension. Indeed, at least in the setting of product 
recalls, bad marks lead to considerable loss in value; moreover, this effect is magnified if a firm is seen 
as “compensating” through its actions on the doing good dimension. Thus, any cost-benefit calculation 
must take account of the portfolio of CSR activities. The returns to “doing good” differ greatly depending 
on a firm’s stance in terms of avoiding harm.  Likewise, the benefits from avoiding harm are higher in 
conjunction with distinction on the doing good dimension than when such distinction is absent. In short, 
avoiding and doing good are complementary activities.  
Of course, this is easier said than done.  Doing good is fairly straightforward and easily 
measured.  Avoiding harm, however, is harder to “prove” and inherently more subjective. A firm may 
unwittingly find itself failing to avoid harm despite its best efforts. This suggests the need for a degree of 
vigilance and managerial skill in the avoiding harm dimension that is considerably more demanding than 
the doing good dimension, and this should be factored in to the cost-benefit analysis.  
6. Managing CSR Effectively 
When implementing CSR as reputation insurance, there is no simple solution for all firms, even within an 
industry. Instead, we offer a framework to enable managers to think through the cost-benefit calculus of 
CSR as reputation insurance.  
6.1 The Nature of the Peril 
As in any actuarial analysis, of fundamental concern is the nature of the peril.  That is, what is 
the magnitude and incidence of events for a firm?  This can differ significantly from firm to firm. For 
instance, a product recall of infant milk formula potentially has a vastly greater effect on firm value than, 
say, a product recall of a calculator.  Thus, the potential cost of events must be assessed.  Working from 
comparable historical events offers a good starting point.  In addition to direct costs, a firm must assess 
the indirect costs of an event.  These costs can include everything from the lost production as a result of 
pulling key management off other projects to deal with the event aftermath to loss of employee morale 
through bad company publicity.   
Next, the probability of such an event occurring must be estimated.  Again, sifting through 
comparable historical data is a good starting point.  Given the paucity of such events and the limited 
data available, the goal of this exercise should not be to obtain extremely precise estimates, rather, it 
should be to obtain estimates reflecting the order of magnitude of the peril.   
6.2 The Cost and Effectiveness of Insurance 
The cost and effectiveness of attempting to insure various perils can also vary substantially.  Of 
fundamental concern is the degree to which an adverse event is attributable to bad luck versus bad 
management.  CSR operates by influencing the perception of adverse events in the direction of bad luck. 
Note, however, that the returns to this influence depend on the base rate attribution. If a firm faces 
perils that will most certainly be attributed to bad luck regardless of its efforts, then CSR offers little 
return. For instance, CSR is of no help for events caused by floods or other natural disasters. In contrast, 
CSR plays a critical role in coloring perceptions of events that would otherwise be viewed as the fault of 
management.  Holding all else constant, the more likely an event is caused by negligence over bad luck, 
the more payoff CSR insurance can have.   
Another consideration is whether CSR activities themselves impact the nature of the peril.  
Some CSR activity might actually reduce the chance of an adverse event.  For example, an energy 
company that devotes resources to conscientious environmental risk management will also likely 
experience adverse environmental events less often.  Meanwhile, other CSR activities might reduce the 
magnitude of loss when an event occurs. For example, investing in local communities can build goodwill 
amongst local customers.  If an event happens, these customers may be more likely to give the firm the 
benefit of the doubt rather than turning to lawyers for redress.  
The visibility of CSR activities is also an important consideration. Community investments that 
are largely invisible offer little reputational benefit.  Visibility considerations are not limited to a firm’s 
customers, it is also important that these activities be observable by investors and regulators if they are 
to influence judgment about negligence versus bad luck.  When deciding which CSR activities to 
participate in it is critical to push hard on which activities can be made known, to which stakeholders- 
large or small, and the differential cost involved in making such activity known and verifiable. 
A firm should also consider which CSR activities it might have a competitive advantage at 
providing.  For example, perhaps a firm already has natural rapport with some local community leaders. 
In that case, leveraging this “asset” can lower the cost and raise the visibility of CSR activities. 
Competitive advantage might also be product-based. For instance, a pharmaceuticals firm that 
manufactures a unique product might donate some fraction of its output to a visible cause.   
A firm should also consider peripheral benefits in providing CSR activities, as this reduces the 
“net” cost of their provision.  For example, if a firm’s employees are particularly keen on investing in a 
particular community project, a firm might leverage this enthusiasm by enlisting the help of these 
employees thus raising morale while reducing costs at the same time. Likewise, peripheral benefits can 
include increased sales to CSR-valuing customers, improving production processes, innovation, and 
others. 
All these factors then play into an effective cost benefit analysis.  Surely it is not a trivial analysis.  
However, it is essential if one is to formulate a coherent CSR strategy.  
7.  Conclusions 
Why should firms engage in CSR activities? Many rationales have been offered with varying degrees of 
success9. Some emphasize the obligations of firms to a broader set of stakeholders; however, fulfilling 
these obligations may come at the expense of the bottom line. Others suggest that CSR and profit 
maximization are not at odds, that a firm’s CSR activity translates into higher customer willingness to 
pay which the firm is somehow able to capture. One key difficulty with this latter rationale is that it 
receives little empirical support.  
We suggest a new rationale for CSR: It acts as a powerful form of reputation insurance when a 
firm suffers an adverse event. For firms whose reputation is a key source of competitive advantage, 
understanding the link between CSR and reputation provides a solution to a “missing markets” 
problem—how to (partially) insure against reputation risk.  
Our multi-year study of S&P 500 firms offers strong evidence of the link between a firm’s CSR 
activities and its stock price response following an adverse event. When viewed through this lens, 
decisions about which CSR activities to pursue and how much to pursue them are amenable to cost-
benefit analyses typical of other forms of insurance. Such a framework is essential if managers seek to 
intelligently allocate resources in this area.  
Our study also revealed the importance of synergies in CSR activities. Firms that harmonize their 
CSR strategies, both doing good and avoiding harm, are largely immune to reputational damage 
following adverse events. The same cannot be said for firms pursuing either aspect of CSR alone. Indeed, 
we find that the disjointed strategy of doing good to compensate for harm produces the greatest 
damage to a firm’s reputation following an event.   
We should caution, however, that our study represents a starting point rather than the last 
word. Our measures of CSR activities are coarse and suffer the same limitations as other studies in this 
area. An important next step is to develop more granular measures for various aspects of CSR. Our study 
is limited to product recalls. Of course, one can think of a variety of other events that impact a firm’s 
reputation. In the future, these would be useful to capture and analyze. Finally, we measure reputation 
in terms of stock price reaction following an event. This measure is only correct to the extent that 
information about the full impact of the harm is priced. Moreover, it conflates reputational harm with 
the direct cost of making affected parties whole following the event. One could fix this problem to some 
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Image 1: Investors and Regulators must Weigh the Chances the Firm had Bad Luck vs. Bad Management 
 
 


























 Figure 2: Doing Harm Rating Over Time of Guidant and Boston Scientific 
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Figure 5: The Amount of Firms of each Quadrant Type having Events 
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1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Doing Harm Only Doing Good Only
Doing Neither Doing Harm and Good
CSR Reputation  Number of Mean Standard   
Type Observations Return Deviation 
Doing Good Only 19 1.10% 2.97% 
Doing Neither 55 -0.50% 4.63% 
Doing Harm Only 83 -0.90% 5.86% 
Doing Harm and Good 27 -2.51% 8.97% 
All Types 184 -0.80% 5.90% 
 
Table 1: Abnormal Change in Firm Value upon an Event per Each CSR Type 
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